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THE FIRST AMENDMENT
AND CANON LAW
BRENDAN F. BROWN*

from 1871 to 1898, the Supreme Court of the
United States determined the relationship between the law of the
state and that of the church on the basis of natural law. In 1871, the
Court decided the epoch-making case of Watson v. Jones.' In that case
the General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church in the United States
had condemned the institution of slavery. This resulted in a schism in
which each faction claimed title to the property of a local church in
Kentucky. The supreme court of that state ruled that the General Assembly had exceeded its jurisdiction. Some of the parties to the dispute lived in Indiana. Because of this diversity of citizenship, the case
was properly brought into the federal courts. The Supreme Court of the
United States upheld the validity of the action of the General Assembly,
and recognized that the title to the property in question belonged to the
anti-slavery faction.
In Watson, the right of the individual to form a church, considered
as a congregation, plus a moral entity with spiritual bonds, was admitted.
Accordingly, a church may possess a governmental structure with a true
juridical order, like the Roman Catholic and Presbyterian Churches, or
have no law-making power, like the Baptist and Congregational
Churches. If a particular church had a governmental structure, it might
be of the prelatial or hierarchical type, with different echelons of superiors, like the Catholic Church, or it might be of the synodal type
with different levels of authoritative bodies, as in the instance of the
Presbyterian Church. If a church lacked a juridical order, then it was
held together solely by spiritual and organizational bonds.
The Watson decision did not recognize the legal personality of any
church, i.e., no church was a legal entity so as to be recognized as an
artificial person before the law with rights and duties, analogous to those
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of a natural person, unless it had been incorporated under civil law. All churches
in the United States were expressly regarded as voluntary religious associations
of individuals. The United States, therefore, made no exceptions in the ecclesiastical sphere to the general rule that all corporations are creatures of the political
sovereign.
The Court in Watson, however, implicitly recognized that those churches with
true juridical orders were moral persons,
when it decided that their decisions were
exempt from review by civil courts. Judgments of a church tribunal were to be conclusive where strictly ecclesiastical questions were involved. In the absence of
fraud and duress, civil courts were obliged
to accept the decisions of a church's court
of last resort, even where such rulings involved property rights. The Court established this doctrine in spite of the fact that
church tribunals are not agents or instrumentalities of the state, and thus the source
of the obligation to obey their decisions
is not to be found in the authority of the
state.
According to American civil law, membership in all churches, even those with
governmental powers and a legal system,
begins with an implied contract. In the instances of churches of the prelatial or synodal kind, this contract creates a status
which thereafter binds the members, regardless of their consent, in such matters
as discipline, ecclesiastical rule, custom
and law. Since this status, which was recognized by the Supreme Court in the Watson case, does not arise from civil law, it
can come only from divine or the ecclesiastical law of a particular church. Hence,
the jurisdiction of church tribunals rests on
what has been described as a "higher
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plane" than that of temporal authority.
The Watson decision, however, did not
recognize the moral personalities of
churches of the congregational type. The
Court stated that "the rights of such bodies
to the use of the property must be determined by the ordinary principles which
govern voluntary associations." 2 Churches
of the congregational type do not recognize
an authority higher than that of the local
church, and are in no way subject to the
discipline or rule of any other body. Authority is considered by them to be moral
and organizational and not juridical.
Watson v. Jones is still the law in the
federal courts and in many state courts.
It was a departure from the earlier judicial theory, held by a number of state
courts, that members were bound to their
church, whatever its type, by a contract
not essentially different from other kinds
of contract. However, this contract did not
result in a status which obligated them to
obey ecclesiastical determinations. Hence,
they were free to have recourse to the civil
courts.
It is significant to note that the holding in the Watson case was based on general law. 3 The Court declared that the
basis of its decision was "a broad and
sound view of the.., system of laws ' 4 and
general principles of the Anglo-American
legal system. These are, however, just
other names for right reason or objective
scholastic natural law. It was natural law,
therefore, which dictated a spirit of freedom for churches and an independence
from secular control or interference. Obviously, man has a natural law right and
duty to belong to a church, to determine its
Id. at 725.
3 Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
4 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679, 727 (1871).
2
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type, and to be bound by an ecclesiastical
juridical order.
Watson was not based on either the liberty clause of the first amendment or any
other provision of the United States Constitution since it was not until 1939, sixtyeight years after Watson, that the Supreme
Court recognized the power of the fourteenth amendment to impose the limitations of the first amendment upon the lawmaking authority of the respective states.
Generally, the relationship between the
law of the state and that of the church as
worked out in Watson accommodates the
position of the canon law which existed in
1871 and which was later embodied in the
present Code of Canon Law. It is in accord with what are now Canons 1 and 100
insofar as these Canons implicitly declare
that the Church is a moral person. According to Canon 1, the Church has the
right and duty to establish a juridical or external order with legislative, judicial, administrative, and executive processes for
those under its jurisdiction. Canon 100
provides that the Catholic Church and the
Apostolic See have the nature of a legal
person by divine ordinance. Implicit in
this is that the church is a moral persona complete, independent and sovereign society with free autonomy in the ecclesiastical sphere. Moral personality flows from
the qualities of transcendence and perpetuity, in addition to perfection and selfsufficiency.
The Watson decision is also adaptable to
what is now Canon 218. This Canon provides that the supreme power of jurisdiction in the universe resides in the Pope
and that his power to rule is independent
of any human authority and extends to all
members of the Church. The hierarchical
structure of the Catholic Church, as it ex-

isted in 1871 and later outlined in the
Code, namely, in Canons 329, 1322, 1326
and 1569#1, was acceptable to American
civil law according to the Watson case.
The Second Period: 1898-1939
In the second period, from 1898 to
1939, the relation between civil and ecclesiastical laws was decided by the Supreme
Court, principally on the authority of international law under the treaty-making
power. Article VI of the Constitution provides, among other things, that "this Constitution and the Laws of the United States
which shall be made in pursuance thereof,
and all Treaties made, or which shall be
made, under the authority of the United
States, shall be the Supreme Law of the
Land." It was in light of this clause that
the Supreme Court recognized not only the
moral, but also the legal, personality of the
Catholic Church in three famous cases. In
each case, the Court held that the law
made by the 1898 Treaty of Paris between
Spain and the United States constituted the
"Supreme Law of the Land."
In this Treaty the executive branch of
the United States government conceded the
juristic personality of the Catholic Church
and papal sovereignty, under international
law, in those territorial acquisitions which
were formerly under Spanish dominion.
The Church had the right to acquire and
possess property of all kinds, as well as to
make contracts and to institute civil and
criminal actions, in accordance with the
"Law of the Land," in Puerto Rico, Cuba,
and the Philippines. From the very beginning of Spanish colonization in 1492, the
legal personality of the Church, with unrestricted corporate rights, including ownership of property, had been acknowledged
by a number of concordats entered into between Spain and the Papacy. International
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law obliged the executive branch of the
United States government to allow the continuation of the status quo in regard to the
law of the Catholic Church in those Spanish possessions which were acquired in
1898. The treaty-making power, in turn,
bound the Supreme Court of the United
States to give effect to the action of the
executive branch.
The first case was Municipality of Ponce
v. Roman Catholic Church. 5 There, the
Roman Catholic Church in Puerto Rico,
through the Bishop, sued the municipality
of Ponce in order to obtain title to property pursuant to an act of the legislative
assembly of Puerto Rico passed in 1904.
This act purported "to confer original jurisdiction on the Supreme Court of Puerto
Rico for the trial and adjudication of certain property claimed by the Roman
Catholic Church in Puerto Rico."6 The defense of the municipality was that this
legislation was contrary to the fourteenth
amendment since it deprived it of property
without due process of law. The Supreme
Court of the United States, rejecting the
arguments of the municipality, held that
the property in question belonged to the
Church. Mr. Justice Fuller wrote:
The corporate existence of the Roman
Catholic Church, as well as the position
occupied by the papacy, has always been
recognized by the Government of the
United States.
At one time the United States maintained
diplomatic relations with the Papal States,
which continued up to the time of the loss
of the temporal power of the papacy.
(Authority omitted.)
The Holy See still occupies a recognized
position in international law, of which the
courts must take judicial notice.7
5 210 U.S. 296 (1908).
6 Id.

In the Ponce case, therefore, the Supreme Court upheld the canonical concept
of the Church's legal and moral personality, under what is now embodied in
Canon 100, not, of course, on the ground
of divine ordinance, but on the authority
of a treaty. What was later the law of
Canon 3, as to the sanctity of concordats,
was therefore followed, i.e., agreements entered into between the Holy See and the
various nations are not abolished or modified by the Code.
Effect was given also in the Ponce case
to what is now Canon 1499, i.e., the
Church can acquire temporal goods by all
just means which are sanctioned in the case
of others by the natural or the positive law.
The ownership of goods belongs, under the
supreme authority of the Apostolic See, to
that legal person which legitimately acquired the goods. The Ponce case also gave
effect to what is now Canon 1518, i.e., as
the Supreme Head of the Church, the
Roman Pontiff is also the supreme administrator of all ecclesiastical goods; and also
to what is now Canon 1517, i.e., the local
ordinary, the Bishop or Exarch, is charged
with the administration of all ecclesiastical
goods which are in his territory and which
have not been removed from his jurisdiction.
The second case was Santos v. Roman
Catholic Church, 8 wherein the legal personality of the Catholic Church was again
recognized. There, the Church sued to recover a chapel from which it had been
ejected by the defendants, members of an
Oglipayan community. The Supreme Court
of the Philippine Islands ordered the defendants to deliver possession to the plaintiff. This decision was affirmed by the Su-
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preme Court of the United States. Mr. Justice Holmes, writing for the majority,
stated that "the only questions open are
those raised by the decision that the Roman Catholic Church is entitled to the possession of the property, and they have now
been answered by Ponce v. Roman Catholic Church, 210 U. S. 296." 9 He continued
to state that "the legal personality of the
Roman Church and its capacity to hold
property in our insular possessions is recognized; and the fact that such property
was acquired from gifts, even of public
funds, is held not to affect the absoluteness of its rights."'1
The third case was Gonzales v. Roman
Catholic Archbishop of Manila.- There, a
benefice had been established in 1820, a
time when a layman could hold the benefice, which carried a considerable income,
and have a priest say the masses in his
place. But under the Church Code, which
became effective in 1918, the plaintiff, a
boy of fourteen, was forbidden appointment. The Supreme Court held that the
Canon Law in force at the time of the appointment, rather than that existing in
1820, controlled the rights of the parties.
Since the claimant was not entitled to be
appointed chaplain, he had no right to earn
a living from the income of the chaplaincy.
The Court wrote: "By Canon 1481 of the
new Code the surplus income of a chaplaincy, after deducting expenses of the acting chaplain, must one-half be added to
the endowment or capital and one-half to
the repair of the church, unless there is a
custom of using the whole for some com'1
mon good to the diocese. 2
9 Id. at 465.

Although in Gonzales, the Court did
not expressly recognize the legal personality of the Catholic Church, it did so impliedly by holding the Archbishop of the
Philippines to be a juristic person amenable to the jurisdiction of the Philippine
courts for the enforcement of legal rights.
Mr. Justice Brandeis delivering the opinion of the Court wrote:
The new Codex Juris Canonici, which was
adopted in Rome in 1917 and was promulgated by the Church to become effective
in 1918, provides that no one shall be appointed to a collative chaplaincy who is not
a cleric, Can. 1442. It requires students
for the priesthood to attend a seminary;
and prescribes their studies, Can. 1354,
1364. It provides that in order to be a
cleric one must have had "prima tonsura,"
Can. 108, par. 1; that in order to have
"prima tonsura" one must have begun the
study of theology, Can. 976, par. 1; and
that in order to study theology one must be
a "bachiller," that is, must have obtained
the first degree in the sciences and liberal
arts, Can. 1365. It also provides that no
one may validly receive ordination unless
in the opinion of the ordinary he has the
necessary qualifications, Can. 968, par. 1,
1464.13
The Third Period: 1939-1965
In the third period, from 1939 to the
present time, the Supreme Court shifted the
basis of the relationship between the juridical orders of church and state, in the respective states of the union, from natural
law to that of the liberty clause of the first
amendment. The 1939 case of Cantwell
v. Connecticut14 involved the constitutionality of a state statute which sought to restrict the house-to-house activities of a
group known as Jehovah's Witnesses. For
the first time it was held that the funda-

10 Ibid.

11 280 U.S. 1 (1929).
121d. at 18.

1"Id. at 13-14.
14310 U.S. 296 (1940).

11
mental concept of liberty, embodied in the
fourteenth amendment, embraced the liberties guaranteed by the first amendment.
Thus, in this revolutionary and controversial case, the Court ruled that the first
amendment not only bound the federal government, but also the states. From then on,
the Supreme Court consistently upheld
church law under the liberty clause of the
fourteenth amendment, rather than the
natural law.
The dominating case in the sphere of
church-state relations in the third period
was Kedrof v. St. Nicholas Cathedral.15
This case resulted from a schism in the
Russian Orthodox Church in the United
States caused by the domination of the
Russian Church in America by the Patriarch of Moscow, then suspected of being
under the control of the Russian government. The schismatics prevailed upon the
legislature of New York to pass special legislation which provided "that all the
churches formerly administratively subject
to the Moscow synod and patriarchate
should for the future be governed by the
ecclesiastical body and hierarchy of the
American metropolitan district."' 16 In Kedroff, the plaintiff, a New York corporation,
was created to acquire a cathedral for the
Russian Orthodox Church in North America. It held legal title to St. Nicholas Cathedral in New York City. The defendants,
clergymen appointed by the supreme authority of the Russian Orthodox Church,
were sued in the New York State courts.
The Court of Appeals of New York decided in favor of the plaintiff; however, the
Supreme Court of the United States reversed.
15 344 U.S. 94 (1952).

16 Id. at 98-99.
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On the basis of the liberty clause of the
first amendment, this case confirmed a long
line of precedent which held that the civil
law will neither interfere with the wholly
spiritual and internal affairs of ecclesiastical juridical orders in general, nor with
the appointment or removal of the clergy
in particular. The Court wrote: "Freedom
to select the clergy, where no improper
methods of choice are proven . . . must
now be said to have federal constitutional
protection as a part of the free exercise of
religion against state interference.' 7 It
added that "legislation that regulates
church administration, the operation of
the churches, the appointment of clergy
prohibits the free exercise of reli. .
gion." ' The Court continued by declaring:
Ours is a government which by the "law
of its being" allows no statute, state or national, that prohibits the free exercise of
religion. There are occasions when civil
courts must draw lines between the responsibilities of church and state for the disposition or use of property. Even in those cases
when the property right follows as an incident from decisions of the church custom
or law on ecclesiastical issues, the church
rule controls. This under our Constitution
necessarily follows in order that there may
be free exercise of religion. 19
The Kedroff case gave effect to Canon
218, which in substance provides that the
Pope has supreme jurisdiction over the
Church in matters of faith, morals, discipline and government, and that this jurisdiction is independent of all human authority. It also gave approval to the independence of all church decisions, although the
ultimate governmental authority might be
37Id. at 117. (Emphasis added.)
18 Id. at 107.
1' Id. at 120-21.
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located outside the United States. It should
also be noted that the authority by which
the Supreme Court interpreted the first
amendment as applying to the states could
only have arisen by introduction of a norm
into the first amendment based upon a
standard outside the Constitution, either
that of natural law or social utility.
In the contemporary phase of the third
period, the Supreme Court began to interpret the establishment clause of the first
amendment so as to prevent the state from
promoting belief in the basic moral values
of the natural law. Within the last few
years, the Supreme Court has redefined
"religion" as understood in Watson v.
Jones, in its interpretation of the establishment clause of the first amendment. In the
leading case of Engel v. Vitale,'0 New York
required the Board of Education of Union
Free District #9, New Hyde Park, New
York, to direct the school district's principal to cause the following philosophical
and rationally derived affirmation to be
said aloud by each class in the presence of
a teacher at the beginning of the school
day: "Almighty God, we acknowledge our
dependence upon Thee, and we beg Thy
blessings upon us, our parents, our teachers, and our country." Students were at
liberty to absent themselves while this
affirmation took place. The practice was
declared unconstitutional on the ground
that it violated the establishment clause of
the first amendment, although the practice
was not attacked as an "establishment,"
but solely as a violation of religious liberty.
According to the Engel decision, "religion" no longer means Church in the traditional sense of a congregation with a
spiritual entity. To establish "religion"
now means to promote belief in any trans-

cendental moral value and to express that
belief. This was the test laid down by Mr.
Justice Frankfurter in McGowan v. Maryland: 21 "The Establishment Clause withdrew from the sphere of legitimate legislative concern and competence a specific, but
comprehensive, area of human conduct:
man's belief or disbelief in the verity of
some transcendental idea and man's expression in action of that belief or disbelief."22 Thus a state officially establishes a
religion when it publically fosters a quasiethical belief and expression. Apparently
the children would not even have been constitutionally allowed to affirm their belief
in the transcendental, intrinsic dignity of
man or the human person (much less the
Divine Being). Applying the Court's reasoning, this might lead to the formation of
the religion of the Church of the Dignity of
the Human Person in New York State.
In June 1963, the case of School Dist. of
Abington Township v. Schempp 23 was decided. There, a Pennsylvania statute required the reading, without comment, of
the Bible and the recitation of the Lord's
Prayer by students at the beginning of the
school day. Students were free to absent
themselves from these exercises. The Supreme Court declared, in effect, that these
practices, though very old, were unconstitutional from their very inception. Of
course, if a natural law affirmation of belief
in the existence of a Creator by students
during school time was unconstitutional, a
fortiori, a supernatural law affirmation of
faith in a Judaeo-Christian source is forbidden by the first amendment.
Hence, the Supreme Court is using the
doctrine of "Judicial Supremacy," based
21

366 U.S. 420, 465-66 (1961).

"" Ibid.
20

370 U.S. 421 (1962).

23

374 U.S. 203 (1963).
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on the authority of natural law, or at least
some moral norm espoused by the Constitution, to devitalize the ideal of natural
law. That is why Mr. Justice Brennan in
the Abington case, upholding Mr. Justice
Frankfurter's insight in the McGowan case,
refers to the situation as a paradox, i.e.,
the Court seems to, but actually does not,
contradict itself by praising the fact that
we are a people whose institutions rest on
basic moral values, and yet paralyzes the
state from promoting those values. It is
respectfully submitted that the situation
does not entail a paradox, but a flat contradiction.
It is manifest that these three cases are
contrary to the spirit of Canon 1373,
which, of course, purports to be binding
only upon Catholic schools. The Canon
implicitly favors the teaching of the natural
moral values to all children, in providing
that "in every elementary school the children must, according to their age, be instructed in Christian doctrine."
Conclusion
Further devitalizing of natural law
values, either as such, or as a part of the
spiritual laws of the various churches, by
the Supreme Court may well disturb an
essential jural postulate of American civilization. The only essential difference between the civilization of the United States
and that of the Communist Bloc is the jural
postulate of the intrinsic, immutable, and
transcendental dignity of the human person. But the survival of that postulate is
now being imperiled more than ever before
because of the growing ascendancy of the
forces of secularism. The Supreme Court
is currently paralyzing the authority of the
state to protect that postulate, while giving
lip service to the great importance of religion for the common good. From the
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foundation of the Republic, there has always been a union of church and state,
i.e., the church of the natural law, if one
may be permitted to use the word "church"
in the sense implicitly given to it by the
Court in recent years. The Court now seeks
to disestablish that church.
It is ironical that the Court has discouraged a laissez-faire attitude on the part
of the state in economic areas of the common good and social justice. Dedication to
the ideal of liberty has not prevented this.
But in the sphere of the first amendment,
dedication to that ideal appears to have
been so great as to identify the establishment clause with the liberty clause. Of
course, the movement of the legal philosophy of the Supreme Court away from the
philosophy of natural law-first, to that
of the neo-Kantian ideal of freedom, read
into the liberty clause of the first amendment, and secondly, to that of social utility
-apparently
has not yet endangered the
holding in Watson v. Jones. If the Court
should find, however, that social utility
dictated that this case should be overruled,
it would be quite easy to do so by a new
interpretation of the liberty clause. It
would only be necessary for the Court to
find that the decision in Watson now impedes religious liberty by its upholding a
coercive, ecclesiastical jurisdiction repugnant to the Constitution. This would be a
serious blow to hierarchical churches.
The purpose of the philosophical affirmation prescribed for the public school children of New York was not to inculcate the
truth or falsity of any particular theological
system, but rather to impress upon such
children, as American citizens, the ultimate
source of their obligations toward state
and society. Manifestly, the source of that
(Continued on page 47)

